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Miller: Cardozo and the Law of Contracts

ONE JUDGE’S LEGACY AND THE NEW YORK COURT OF
APPEALS: MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO AND THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS
Meredith R. Miller *
INTRODUCTION
Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo sat on the New York Court
of Appeals from 1914 to 1932. 1 During those roughly 18 years, he
authored over 100 contract law decisions. 2 By his own description and
the description of others, Cardozo was a dedicated contextualist. Yet,
at least in the area of contract law, the contemporary New York Court
of Appeals has taken a decidedly textualist approach.
Using the backdrop of contract law, this article begins by
contrasting the jurisprudential approach of Cardozo to that of the
contemporary New York Court of Appeals. It then explores how
Cardozo might have decided a couple of notable and relatively recent
New York Court of Appeals contract law cases. The article draws on
these comparisons to explore what the recent jurisprudence of the
Court tells us about Cardozo’s legacy and the Court as an institution.
Finally, the article concludes by questioning the doctrinal
underpinnings of formalism – namely, the superiority of “certainty”
and “predictability.” 3 Cardozo had it right – that is to say, the drive
for doctrinal coherence and predictability should not underestimate the
complexity of business relations or the nature of contracting. The best
approach is that which most precisely aims to support the parties’

*Professor

of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College; principal, Miller Law,
PLLC.
1 Judith S. Kaye, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE COURTS
OF NEW YORK, http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-courtappeals/cardozo-benjamin.html (last visited July 31, 2017).
2 Arthur Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J. 426, 426
(1938-1939). The title of Corbin’s article is appropriated for the title of this article.
3 Id. at 457.

263

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 16

264

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

realistic expectations from the transaction. It is not possible for the
law to achieve this goal if it ignores the surrounding context of a deal.
I.

CARDOZO AS A CONTEXTUALIST

In 1938, in Volume 48 of the Yale Law Journal, Arthur Corbin
dedicated an entire article to the subject of Cardozo’s contract law
jurisprudence. 4 Corbin took a stroll through Cardozo’s “greatest hits,”
often quoting liberally from the decisions. 5 From that exercise, Corbin
observed: “Cardozo’s opinions on contract law demonstrate his
instinct for a justice that is human and practical.” 6 Corbin wrote,
“There is a clear genius in [Cardozo’s] filling of gaps, his finding of
promises by implication where none was put into clear words, his
discovery and enforcement of the directing purpose for which a
contract was made, not permitting that purpose to fail by reason of
vagueness in details.” 7
Corbin’s exposition and Cardozo’s own writings support the
characterization of Cardozo as a “contextualist.” Indeed, Cardozo was
transparent about his approach to judging in The Nature of Judicial
Process, 8 the publication of a series of lectures Cardozo gave at Yale
during his tenure on the Court of Appeals. 9 In the lectures, Cardozo
described the judicial decision making process as involving a number
of “forces,” which include: logic, history, custom, utility and “accepted
standards of right conduct.” 10 Cardozo wrote that the weight of each
of these forces was itself contextual: “[w]hich of these forces shall
dominate in any case, must depend largely on comparative importance
or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or
impaired.” 11
Cardozo described the common law as “at bottom the
philosophy of pragmatism.” 12 His approach to deciding cases was a
fluid one: “For every tendency, one seems to see a counter-tendency;
4

Id. at 426.
Id.
6 Id. at 427.
7 Corbin, supra note 2, at 427.
8 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Quid Pro Books ed.,
2010) (originally published by Yale University Press, 1921).
9 Id. at vii.
10 Id. at 70.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 64.
5

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/16

2

Miller: Cardozo and the Law of Contracts

2018

CARDOZO AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

265

for every rule its antinomy. Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All
is fluid and changeable. There is an endless ‘becoming.’” 13 This fluid
approach, of course, does not give highest priority to certainty and
predictability. Cardozo wrote of certainty:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the
bench, to find how trackless was the ocean on which I
had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed
and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was
futile. I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed
and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that would
declare itself by tokens plainer and more commanding
than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own
vacillating mind and conscience . . . . [A]nd as I have
reflected more and more upon the nature of judicial
process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty,
because I have grown to see it as inevitable. 14
Cardozo opined that certainty and, with that, the “symmetrical
development of the law” were not the only guideposts for decision
making and are necessarily balanced against other concerns. 15 He
wrote, “[t]he social interests served by symmetry or certainty must
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and
fairness or other elements of social welfare.” 16 This approach, which
does not give highest priority to certainty and predictability, admittedly
lacks in “precision.” 17
A contextualist approach is apparent in Cardozo’s contract law
decisions.
For example, in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills,18
there was an exchange of letters between two merchants concerning an
order of goods. The seller wrote to the buyer, in relevant part, the
following: “Also note that the price of $3.10 per box on your Fil
D’Angora brand which we are to ship to you is subject to change
pending tariff revision.” 19 The buyer wrote back, confirming the order

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 13.
CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 106-07.
CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 71.
CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 71.
CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 19.
254 N.Y. 179 (1930).
Id. at 182.
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at $3.10 per box. 20 The seller then refused to deliver the goods, arguing
that the agreement was not complete because its letter stated “all prices
subject to pending tariff.” 21 Cardozo held the seller to the contract and
refused to adhere to the literal interpretation the seller proffered. 22
Cardozo wrote that the letters were “to be read as business men
would read them, and only as a last resort are to be thrown out
altogether as meaningless futilities.” 23 He went on to explain that the
interpretation proffered by the seller, even if plausible on its face, could
not possibly comport with the expectations of the parties:
The [seller] like the [buyer] supposed that in signing
these documents it was doing something understood to
be significant and serious. It not only accepted the
[buyer’s] order, but it asked the [buyer] to confirm the
terms of the acceptance, and followed this with a cable
of the order to its manufacturer abroad. Was it all sound
and fury, signifying nothing? 24
Cardozo would not read the language literally because it would
lead to “sheer absurdity,” especially given that, in June 1929, Congress
was debating a new tariff, which was uncertain to pass and, if it did,
could affect the prices of imports. 25 Given that context, Cardozo stated
that, while the language was not perfectly expressed, no seller and no
buyer would read it the way the seller now suggested. 26
Another example is Cardozo’s decision in Moran v. Standard
Oil Co. 27 There, an agent expressly agreed to sell the defendant’s paint
and painting supplies on a commission basis for five years, but there
was no express corresponding promise by the defendant to use the
agent for five years. 28 When the defendant terminated the agent, the
defendant argued that the agent was at will, subject to termination any
time. 29 Cardozo disagreed and implied a promise by the defendant to
keep the agent for those five years:
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Outlet Embroidery Co., 254 N.Y. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
211 N.Y. 187 (1914).
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
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The law, in construing the common speech of men, is
not so nice in its judgments as the defendant’s argument
assumes. It does not look for precise balance of phrase,
promise matched against promise in perfect
equilibrium. It does not seek such qualities even in
written contracts, unless perhaps the most formal and
deliberate, and least of all does it seek them where the
words are chosen by the master under legal advice and
accepted by the servant without the aid of like
instruction.
There are times when reciprocal
engagements do not fit each other like the parts of an
indented deed, and yet the whole contract . . . may be
‘instinct with obligation’ imperfectly expressed. 30
Cardozo used the phrase “instinct with obligation” again in his
famous decision in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. 31 In that case,
to avoid a lack of consideration, Cardozo implied a return promise by
plaintiff Otis Wood to make reasonable efforts to market Lady DuffGordon’s designs. 32 In that decision, Cardozo named and addressed
formalism head on:
It is true that [Wood] does not promise in so many
words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the
defendant’s indorsements and market her designs. We
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be
implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign
talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader
view to-day. A promise may be lacking, and yet the
whole writing may be ‘instinct with obligation’
imperfectly expressed. 33
Along similar lines, in Marks v. Cowdin, 34 an employer signed
a memo recognizing continued employment of an employee for two
years. 35 Before the two years ended, the employer terminated the
30

Id. at 197-98.
222 N.Y. 88, 91 (1917). Cardozo also referenced this language and the Wood case in The
Nature of Judicial Process. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 62.
32 Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. at 90-91.
33 Id.
34 226 N.Y. 138 (1919).
35 Id. at 140.
31
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employee. 36 The agreement, which called for the provision of services
for two years, came within the statute of frauds and was required to be
in writing. 37 The memo did not identify the employee’s position or
describe the employee’s duties, but Cardozo held that the memo was
nevertheless sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds because one must
look beyond the language on the face of the memo itself:
In thus identifying the position we are not importing
into the contract a new element of promise. We are
turning signs and symbols into their equivalent
realities. This must always be done to some extent, no
matter how many are the identifying tokens. ‘In every
case, the words must be translated into things and facts
by parol evidence.’ How far that process may be
extended is a question of degree. We exclude the
writing that refers us to spoken words of promise. We
admit the one that bids us ascertain a place or a relation
by comparison of the description with some ‘manifest,
external, and continuing fact.’ The statute must not be
pressed to the extreme of a literal and rigid logic. Some
compromise is inevitable if words are to fulfill their
function as symbols of things and of ideas. How many
identifying tokens we are to exact, the reason and
common sense of the situation may tell us. 38
Cardozo instructs that the contract is to be interpreted in light of what
reason and common sense suggest in the given situation, not by literal
adherence to the language on the face of a document. 39
II.

THE FORMALISM OF THE CONTEMPORARY NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS

By contrast, the modern institution of New York courts, and
especially its highest court, adheres to formalism. Professor Geoffrey
P. Miller has hypothesized that the formalism of New York courts
explains why it is common for major business transactions to contain

36
37
38
39

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143-44 (citations omitted).
Marks, 226 N.Y. at 144-45.
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choice of law clauses that opt for New York law. 40 Professor Miller
compared many facets of contract doctrine in New York and
California–from formation to interpretation–and determined that, in
most areas of the doctrine, New York adheres to formalism.41
Professor Miller opined that this formalism, which leads to certainty
and predictability, explained why businesses opt for New York law. 42
Miller found: “New York judges are formalists. Especially in
commercial cases, they have little tolerance for attempts to re-write
contracts to make them fairer or more equitable, and they look to the
written agreement as the definitive source of interpretation.” 43
He continued:
Both New York and California recognize freedom of
contract as fundamental, although limited at times by
other values; however New York gives comparatively
more weight to contractual freedom. In the absence of
severe inequality of bargaining power, New York
courts almost never upset private arrangements, no
matter how inequitable they may appear ex post. New
York’s tenderness for freedom of contract expresses
itself, at times, in a seemingly atavistic pleasure in
imposing the consequences of bad bargains. 44
On this point, Miller cited Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 45 a 1995 New York Court of Appeals decision,
which, at least for “sophisticated parties,” 46 unambiguously expressed
an adherence to formalism:
Freedom of contract prevails in an arm’s length
transaction between sophisticated parties such as these,
and in the absence of countervailing public policy
concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the
consequences of their bargain. If they are dissatisfied

40 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1475, 1477 (2010) [hereinafter BARGAINS BICOASTAL].
41 Id. at 1478-80.
42 Id. at 1522.
43 Id. at 1478.
44 Id. at 1479.
45 86 N.Y.2d 685 (1995).
46 Id. at 695.
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with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to
say so [was] at the bargaining table.’ 47
III.

WHAT WOULD CARDOZO DO?

If Cardozo was on the New York Court of Appeals today it is
uncertain whether he would influence its approach to decision making
or simply wind up a frequent dissenting voice.
A. Conditions & Substantial Performance
Take for example Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon & Co., quoted above. In that case, plaintiff (a national, fullservice investment firm) had three years remaining on a lease of the
33rd floor of One New York Plaza in Manhattan. 48 Defendant (an
accounting firm) was already a tenant on the 29th floor of the same
building. 49 Plaintiff was looking to vacate the premises and sublease
the space on the 33rd floor. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a letter
agreement setting forth certain conditions precedent to the formation
of a sublease between them. 50
Defendant wanted to construct a telephone linkage system
between the 29th and 33rd floors. 51 Thus, one express condition
precedent to formation of the sublease was that plaintiff provide
defendant with the prime landlord’s consent in writing on or before a
date certain. 52 On that date certain, plaintiff’s attorney called
defendant’s attorney to say that the prime landlord had consented to
the work. 53 When defendant later refused to go forward with the
sublease, plaintiff sued for breach of contract. 54
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety,
claiming that the sublease was never formed because plaintiff failed to
comply with the express condition precedent that plaintiff provide
defendant with written notice of the prime landlord’s consent.55
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 689.
Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 687-90.
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Plaintiff argued that its attorney notified defendant orally and,
therefore, substantially complied with the condition. 56 The New York
Court of Appeals held for defendant on the ground that the express
condition precedent required written notice and, therefore, it had not
been satisfied. 57
It is black letter law that an express condition requires strict
compliance. 58 The reasoning is that the court should not frustrate the
clearly expressed intention of the parties. 59 In Oppenheimer, the oral
notice of the prime landlord’s consent did not satisfy the strict
requirement of written notice. 60 For sure, the result seems harsh and
overly technical. The parties’ attorneys had a discussion, and through
that discussion, defendant was on actual notice of the prime landlord’s
consent to the work. 61 Certainly, plaintiff had complied with the spirit
of the condition.
Notably absent from the decision was any discussion of what
Cardozo likely would have paid the most attention to: the parties’
intent in requiring written notice. One can certainly imagine that
defendant wanted tangible evidence of the prime landlord’s consent
before taking on any obligations. On the other hand, another very
plausible view of the case is that defendant was not so concerned about
having the notice in writing but was able to use the written notice
condition as a pretext, as a way to walk away from the sublease based
on a technicality. The Court appeared to recognize the technical nature
of the decision (some might describe it as “gotcha formalism”).
Absent more context concerning the condition, despite the fact that he
is quoted and his name is invoked, it is hard to imagine that Cardozo
would have joined with the majority.
The parties in Oppenheimer each relied on the 1921 Cardozo
decision in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 62 to support their positions. In
Jacob & Youngs, a builder contracted to build a summer residence and
the written contract called for use of Reading pipe. 63 For most of the
house, the builder used Cohoes pipe instead. 64 Cohoes pipe was
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 692.
Id. at 690-91.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 695.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688-89.
230 N.Y. 239 (1921).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 246.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 16

272

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

inferred to be no different in quality or grade than Reading pipe. 65
Nevertheless, the client refused to pay the builder because the contract
specified Reading pipe. 66 Notably, the only way to change out the
pipes was to tear down the entire structure and rebuild. 67
Writing for the dissent, Judge Chester B. McLaughlin would
have held that the client should get exactly what he contracted for –
Reading pipe:
The defendant had a right to contract for what he
wanted. He had a right before making payment to get
what the contract called for. . . . What his reason was
for requiring this kind of pipe is of no importance. He
wanted that and was entitled to it. 68
There is some appeal in McLaughlin’s simply applied rule that adheres
to the letter of the contract. But Cardozo, writing for majority, took a
different approach.
Cardozo held that, even though the builder did not use the
specified pipe, this entitles the client to damages – namely the
difference in objective value between what he was promised and what
he received (there, zero). 69 The failure, which was not substantial, did
not excuse the client from paying the builder. 70 Cardozo explained:
Considerations partly of justice and partly of
presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that
promise shall be placed in one class or in another. The
simple and the uniform will call for different remedies
from the multifarious and the intricate. The margin of
departure within the range of normal expectation upon
a sale of common chattels will vary from the margin to
be expected upon a contract for the construction of a
mansion or a ‘skyscraper.’ There will be harshness
sometimes and oppression in the implication of a
condition when the thing upon which labor has been
expended is incapable of surrender because united to
the land, and equity and reason in the implication of a
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 241.
Id. at 246.
Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 240-41.
Id. at 247 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
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like condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is
in shape to be returned. From the conclusion that
promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent
of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of
justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that
they may not be so treated without a perversion of
intention. Intention not otherwise revealed may be
presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and
probable. If something else is in view, it must not be
left to implication. There will be no assumption of a
purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive
retribution. 71
He continued:
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the
development of legal rules than of practical adaptation
to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by a
classification where the lines of division are so
wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless, may be
said on the score of consistency and certainty in favor
of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such
considerations against those of equity and fairness, and
found the latter to be the weightier. The decisions in this
state commit us to the liberal view, which is making its
way, nowadays, in jurisdictions slow to welcome it. 72
In Oppenheimer, both sides discussed the Jacob & Youngs
decision extensively in briefing to the Court. 73 Plaintiff argued that the
written notice was just like the pipes in Jacob & Youngs – plaintiff told
the defendant orally that the work had been approved. 74 Even though
the notice was not in writing, the plaintiff had substantially complied
and the intention of including that provision had been fulfilled.75
71

Id. at 242.
Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 242-43.
73 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon &
Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685 (1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050831 (N.Y.), at *9; Brief of
Plaintiff-Respondent, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685
(1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050834 (N.Y.), at *4, 27, 30, 35, 38, 40, 47; Reply Brief
of Defendant-Appellant, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d
685 (1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050837 (N.Y.), at *5-6.
74 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, at *39-41.
75 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, at *36.
72
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Defendant also pointed to Jacob & Youngs by distinguishing it.76
Defendant argued that, unlike Jacob & Youngs, the agreement, by
using the word “unless,” had used language of express condition,
requiring strict adherence. 77 Defendant successfully argued that,
unlike Jacob & Youngs, the express condition required more than
substantial compliance. 78
In siding with defendant’s literal
interpretation, the Court held that the express condition did not permit
for substantial performance but, rather, required strict compliance with
the requirement of written notice. 79 The Court looked to Cardozo’s
language in Jacob & Youngs:
But Judge Cardozo was careful to note that the situation
would be different in the case of an express condition:
“This is not to say that the parties are not free
by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose
that performance of every term shall be a
condition of recovery. That question is not here.
This is merely to say that the law will be slow
to impute the purpose, in the silence of the
parties, where the significance of the default is
grievously out of proportion to the oppression
of the forfeiture.” 80
Certainly, this was what Cardozo had written in Jacob & Youngs. But
it is difficult to concede that he would have reached the same result in
Oppenheimer. Cardozo would have wanted to know more: what was
the purpose of requiring a writing? What was customary in these types
of subleases? In the words of his decision in Outlet Embroidery, was
the Court reading the words of the agreement “as business men would
read them”? 81

76
77
78
79
80
81

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *9-10.
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *8.
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *3-4.
Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 694.
Id. (quoting Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 243-44).
Outlet Embroidery Co., 254 N.Y. at 183.
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B. Vagueness and Indefiniteness
Cardozo was not afraid of vagueness or indefiniteness. This
placed him in the dissent in Varney v. Ditmars. 82 There, an employer
was paying $35 per week and when the employee was offered another
job that would pay more, the employer told the employee to stay with
the company and the employee would receive $40 per week plus, at
the end of the year, a “fair share of [] profits.” 83 When the employer
did not follow through on the promise, the issue was whether the
promise to pay a “fair share” was too vague, indefinite and uncertain
to enforce. 84 Judge Emory Chase, writing for the majority of the court,
held that the promise was too indefinite to bind the employer:
The statement alleged to have been made by the
defendant about giving the plaintiff and said designer a
fair share of his profits is vague, indefinite and
uncertain and the amount cannot be computed from
anything that was said by the parties or by reference to
any document, paper or other transaction. The minds of
the parties never met upon any particular share of the
defendant’s profits to be given the employees or upon
any plan by which such share could be computed or
determined. The contract so far as it related to the
special promise or inducement was never
consummated. 85
Cardozo dissented, on the firmly held belief that, if presented with
relevant evidence, the Court could figure out what was “fair” and there
was, thus, a promise that could be enforced. 86 Cardozo wrote:
I do not think it is true that a promise to pay an
employee a fair share of the profits in addition to his
salary is always and of necessity too vague to be
enforced. The promise must, of course, appear to have
been made with contractual intent. But if that intent is
present, it cannot be said from the mere form of the
promise that the estimate of the reward is inherently
82
83
84
85
86

217 N.Y. 223 (1916).
Id. at 225, 226.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 233 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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impossible. The data essential to measurement may be
lacking in the particular instance, and yet they may
conceivably be supplied. 87
Approximately fifty years after Cardozo left the New York
Court of Appeals, in Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 88
the Court maintained this approach to indefiniteness when it took a
decidedly formalist approach to “agreements to agree.” 89 Agreements
to agree are a classic contract law problem for courts because, absent
an ability of the parties to reach an agreement, without clear
instruction, the manner enforcing the promise to agree is indefinite.90
The case involved a renewal clause in the lease of a space operated as
a deli. 91 The renewal clause was described by the Court as “unadorned”
because it did not set a renewal rent or provide a method for calculating
the renewal rent. 92 Instead, it only provided that the renewal rent was
“to be agreed.” 93 Judge Jacob D. Fuchsberg held that the renewal
clause could not be enforced: “[A] mere agreement to agree, in which
a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable.” 94
Dissenting in part, Judge Michael J. Jasen channeled Cardozo
and would have set the rent by implying a reasonable rent term,
pointing to the Appellate Division decision written by Judge Leon
Lazer that the Court was reversing. 95 Judge Lazer had held that
87 Varney, 217 N.Y. at 233. Another example of Cardozo’s fluidity and openness to
uncertainty arises in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 387-88 (1919).
There, Cardozo held that a clause prohibiting oral modification of the contract was
unenforceable because the clause itself is subject to amendment or waiver. He wrote:
Those who make a contract may unmake it. The clause which forbids a
change, may be changed like any other. The prohibition of an oral waiver,
may itself be waived. . . . What is excluded by one act, is restored by
another. You may put it out by the door; it is back through the window.
Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their
power to contract again.
Later, a New York statute was enacted to extinguish “the Beatty rule” and allow enforcement
of “no oral modification clauses.” N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney 2018). In
Israel v. Chabra, 12 N.Y.3d 158 (2009), the New York Court of Appeals reinforced the statute
and the nullity of the Beatty rule.
88 52 N.Y.2d 105 (1981).
89 Id. at 110.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 108.
92 Id. at 110-11.
93 Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, 52 N.Y.2d at 111.
94 Id. at 109.
95 Id. at 112 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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enforcement of the renewal clause better effectuates the intent of the
parties than striking the clause altogether. 96 He further held that a
“renewal option has a more sympathetic claim to enforcement than []
most vague [] terms” because valuable consideration will often have
already been paid for the option. 97 This position is classic Cardozo: an
interpretation that looks to context better effectuates the intent of the
parties than a literal adherence to the words (or lack of words) of the
written agreement.
IV.

WHAT DOES THE FORMALISM OF THE NEW YORK COURT
OF APPEALS TELL US ABOUT THE LEGACY OF JUDGE
CARDOZO OR THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION?

Judge Cardozo was not making new laws or changing contract
doctrine per se. He had a philosophy about judging that looked beyond
the literal – especially to avoid absurd results. Given that he is the
most revered and recognized judge to ever serve on the New York
Court of Appeals, one might think that his judicial philosophy would
be his legacy and would leave a mark on how the institution decides
cases. That said, there is an insight that can be drawn from the
divergent approaches of Cardozo and the modern court generally as an
institution, but it is not a new one. The insight was already articulated
in Professor Andrew Kaufman’s biography of Cardozo and more
specifically in Professor Kaufman’s foreword to The Nature of
Judicial Process. 98 There, Professor Kaufman wrote:
A common complaint, offered by judges, is that
Cardozo’s prescription does not help a judge to decide
a particular case. Of course not. Indeed, in a way, a
subtheme of Cardozo’s lectures is that judicial
decision-making involves a nuanced approach among
different considerations, any one of which may be
dominant with respect to a particular issue or in the
context of particular facts. He was essentially an
accommodationist, but the totality of the messages was
ambiguous. That ambiguity, I think, has contributed to
his enduring reputation. How one applies Cardozo to
96 Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979), rev’d, 52 N.Y.2d 105 (1981).
97 Id.
98 CARDOZO, supra note 8.
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different situations depends on what strand of thought
is emphasized in different contexts. Even judges who
subscribe fully to his message will put the elements of
decision-making together in different ways in
particular cases, each side citing different Cardozo
words for support.99
Indeed, part of Cardozo’s enduring legacy is exactly that: because he
took a contextual approach to deciding cases, his decisions are often
used by both sides of the same case to support their position. This is
true in Oppenheimer, where, as discussed, both sides invoked
Cardozo’s decision in Jacob & Youngs to the extent that it served their
arguments. 100 There is a beauty in Cardozo’s rejection of simplicity
and certainty. In the complexities that contextualism embraces, his
decisions will be invoked in varying ways, often in competing sides of
the same case.
V.

CONCLUSION: IS “CERTAINTY” AND “PREDICTABILITY”
REALLY BETTER FOR BUSINESS?

The unexpected place this research leads is to question the
apparent assumption of formalism in contract doctrine – that certainty
and predictability in contract doctrine is better for business. 101 This, it
seems, is an oversimplification of business relationships and the nature
of contracting.
In Regulating Contracts, Professor Hugh Collins has written
about “contractual behaviour” as existing in three dimensions: the
business relation, the economic deal and the contract. 102 The business
relation is in part social, or what might be described as relational, and
“precedes the transaction and is expected to persist after
performance.” 103 Professor Collins explains “[i]t consists of the
trading relation between the parties, made up by numerous
interactions, some of which may involve contracts, but often will

99

CARDOZO, supra note 8, at x-xi (emphasis added).
Compare Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, with Reply Brief of DefendantAppellant, supra note 73.
101 Indeed, Professor Miller identified this premise as a reason that choice of law clauses in
major transactions commonly opted for New York law. BARGAINS BICOASTAL, supra note 40,
at 1522.
102 HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 128 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
103 Id. at 129.
100
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consist of enquiries, discussions of plans, and sorting out problems
which have arisen.” 104 The economic deal is the agreement between
the parties – the economics of the obligations exchanged. 105 The
contract is the standards of self-regulation set by the parties or, more
commonly, their attorneys. 106
A formalist approach to determining the parties’ obligations
most intently (if not exclusively) focuses on this third dimension – the
literal form of the written document. But, once these three dimensions
are acknowledged, supporting the parties’ intentions becomes
complicated. Cardozo recognized this complexity and the elusive
nature of certainty. His approach, which valued context, left open the
exploration of all three dimensions in interpreting whether and to what
extent the parties had obligated themselves.
Brilliantly, Professor Collins explains that there can be a
“tension between the objective of supporting the expectation of the
parties and the distracting planning documents” and he posits that “the
kind of legal regulation of contract which best suits the interests of
business is one which supports the expectation of business in entering
transactions.” 107 This approach to contracts would “give priority to the
business relation, with secondary attention to the business deal, and
relegate the contract to a peripheral role.” 108 Professor Collins
recognizes that this view is controversial because of the “paramount
importance” that lawyers attach to “the value of certainty.”109
Professor Collins writes:
My contention is that the type of law that best
contributes to the construction of markets and a vibrant
economy would be one that avoids clear-cut
entitlements based upon the contractual framework in
favour of a more contextual examination of business
expectations based upon the business relation and the
business deal. In order to achieve this style of legal
reasoning, it is necessary to reduce its formalism, and
to point the courts towards an investigation of the

104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id. at 129-31.
Id. at 131-32.
COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175.
COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175.
COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175.
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relations and expectations in which the contract is
embedded. 110
Cardozo understood this intuitively.

110

COLLINS, supra note 102, at 176.
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